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The public choice-school has explained why policy-making is generally disappointing 
and frequently against the very interest of the public at large. The economics profession 
has put forward two kinds of allegedly free-market remedies. On the one h and, the 
mainstream view underscores the need for more expert advice and better agency rules. 
On the other, the constitutional standpoint emphasizes the role of meta-rules founded on 
a social contract, so that abuse can be restrained, if not eliminated. 
  This paper questions the foundations of the new contractarian views, which 
hardly escape the consequentialist and utilitarian problems raised by the orthodox 
approach to policy-making. In particular, it is argued that in order to understand the 
nature of today’s policy-making, rational constructivism is of little help; competing 
explanations, such as those offered by the institutional or the evolutionary schools, are 
similarly ineffective. 
  The insufficiencies of the mainstream approaches suggest an alternative. We 
develop the idea that  “First Principles”  – that is those set of ideas that have 
characterized Western Civilization during the past two millennia – provide a better lens 




This paper is part of a broader research project on the methodological foundations of 
policy-making. I am extremely grateful to the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) 
and to the Searle Center (Northwestern University School of Law), where I have been 
working as a National Fellow and a Visiting Fellow in 2008/2009 and where these 
pages have been written. I am also indebted to the Searle Center for the many insightful 
comments I received on the occasion of my presentation at their Faculty Workshop. 2 
 
1.  On the making, credibility and stability of norms 
This is an imperfect world. Democracies frequently suffer from bad norms promulgated 
by short-sighted politicians, most of whom ignore what they are legislating about, but 
who are often prepared to give in to interest groups and please representative or noisy 
enough layers of the voting population. As the public choice tradition has explained by 
applying the rational-choice postulate to the rule-makers, this is hardly surprising. 
Politicians are human beings like all others and the procedures by which they are 
chosen do not put a premium on honesty, let alone altruism. If anything, the selection 
process operates in the opposite direction. Independent thinking is not a plus and 
occasionally even being reasonable might develop into a liability. In short, rule-makers 
are rationally inclined to act and legislate in order to enhance their own welfare, and to 
do whatever is necessary to secure the consensus, popularity and reputation required for 
election, re-election or appointment. In many occasions party loyalty prevails upon 
moral integrity and the quality of the laws is affected as a consequence.  
To be fair, the outcome of the legislative process is not always 
counterproductive or ruinous. It does happen that norms are consistent with common 
sense and the interests of the community broadly understood. Still, even when one 
abstains from evaluating the quality of the rules, and even when funding is not a 
problem, nothing guarantees that the rules are applied properly. For instance, the 
bureaucrats frequently strive to adapt them to their own requirements and preferences. 
They may also find it advantageous to increase the cost the citizen must incur to qualify 
for protection under a given piece of legislation. It needs not be a matter of blatant 
crime and corruption. Sometimes it is shirking; sometimes civil servants deliberately 
delay, or multiply the decision-making layers in order t o avoid responsibility; 
sometimes it is just an effort to enhance the bureaucrat’s own discretion in accordance 
with man’s natural longing for prestige and power, or to create additional demand for 
the bureaucrat’s services, which justifies his job and possibly breeds chances for career 
advancement
1.  
The judiciary can also be a source of uncertainty, whenever the actors adhere to 
their own reading of what legal rules actually mean, or to their own convictions on how 
                                                 
1 Revolving-door mechanisms might also play an important role. The more complicated the regulation 
and the greater the importance of establishing personal stable relations with the civil service, the greater 
the opportunities in the private sector for those bureaucrats who want to switch to the other side and 
become an intermediary between the private sector and their former colleagues. 3 
 
to adapt them to specific circumstances
2. Given that most cases can be branded as 
‘specific’, the application of the same rule can easily generate different outcomes and 
thereby undermine its credibility, that is its ability to provide clear and consistent 
indication about what is legal (or illegal), and precise enough predictions about people’s 
behavior. This phenomenon is compounded by the fact that more and more legislation 
results from political log-rolling and compromise, thereby leading to hazy texts, 
possibly characterized by loopholes and inconsistencies. Not surprisingly, they create 
ample scope (and need) for interpretation, and might also be the terrain where the 
judiciary and the legislative collude or come to blows. 
The large number of regulation that the legislative and regulatory bodies pass 
every year does not help, either. This phenomenon is even more evident when the 
activities of international and supra-national agencies are taken into account, requiring 
adjustment by the national legislation, a task which is far from easy, quick or flawless. 
The judiciary usually tries to solve these inconsistencies by interpreting the original 
intent of the legislator, or by referring to some higher notion (e.g. constitutional super-
laws), or by making use of general principles, more or less vaguely defined. Social 
justice, fairness and equality are well known examples of such principles. The 
bureaucrats also play a role in cutting through the hundreds of thousands of pages of 
new legislation that an advanced country with a reasonably ‘productive’ rule-making 
apparatus creates every year, although in such cases informal rules of conduct might 
prevail, as each office/agency tends to develop its own routines and codes of conduct.  
Whatever the outcome, the bottom line is that contradictions and all but 
insurmountable complexities are inevitable. They create room for discretionary 
clarification and ironically demand for further legislation. In the end, credibility suffers 
and potentially counterproductive effects result. Sadly enough, while technological 
progress makes exchange with private counterparts in the marketplace more and more 
impersonal, the opposite holds true when dealing with the world of rule-making and 
rule enforcement.  
                                                 
2 Statutes are necessarily incompletely defined and are therefore an obvious candidate for interpretation, 
especially when it comes to sanctions. The same is also true for precedent, although it is widely 
acknowledged that even in common-law countries the rules of social cooperation are dictated by statutory 
laws and regulations to an increasingly large extent. See for instance Harnay-Marciano (2007) for an 
inquiry into the motivations of the judge within a common-law system.   4 
 
This increased complexity inevitably affects regulatory and legislative stability. 
As old rules prove ineffective or obsolete, and pressure for ‘reform’ rises, uncertainty 
about what the rule might be prescribing in the future creeps in, exchange is 
discouraged by potential litigation, opportunistic behavior increases and the agents’ 
time horizon shortens. Not only does uncertainty reduce the discounted value of future 
income streams and therefore, ceteris paribus, negatively affects individuals’ welfare
3, 
but many agents would actually spot opportunities to engage in contracts while hoping 
in forthcoming reforms with retroactive enforcement (or retroactive enforcement 
criteria). They would bet on the conflicts that might eventually arise, and thereby 
contribute to sapping the coordination and perhaps the reliability of property-right 
structures as well. 
 
2.  Looking for constitutional solutions 
All the above shows that even when the legislator means well, the traditional notion of 
rule of law – i.e. a system of credible, consistent and stable coercive rules that people 
acknowledge as fair and effective
4 – rests on fairly shaky ground. Nonetheless, a large 
part of the economic profession believes to have found a solution.  
                                                 
3 In a similar vein, Nicita (2007) underscores the importance of what he defines as ‘ex ante transaction 
costs’, i.e. the costs related to the incomplete definition of property rights, which leads to litigation and 
discourages exchange. 
4 Following Hayek (1960), the recent literature on the importance of the rule of law actually focuses more 
on the features that enhance individual planning, long-term coordination among agents and behavioral 
predictability, rather than on the actual content of the rules. Put differently, more attention is being 
devoted to the procedural qualities of the rules, rather than to their foundations. Thus, justice (and the rule 
of law) is no longer a criterion to make sure that the individual rights are safeguarded, but that the 
individual is not discriminated against. The frame of reference is not a moral benchmark, but the other 
members of the community. For instance, many rule-of-law supporters are happy with regulation as long 
as it is credible, stable, simple to understand,  easy to enforce and applicable to everybody engaging in 
given activities. Whether the rule is good or bad seems to have a lesser impact on the rule-of-law label. 
The same applies to the rather ambiguous definitions of ‘everybody’ and of ‘given activities’. 
   In the end, consequentialism prevails. Prominent advocates of the rule-of-law approach to economic 
performance (growth) do emphasize the importance of securing private property rights and individual 
freedom (which is not necessarily equivalent to freedom from coercion). Nonetheless, both goals remain 
subject to important qualifications. As a result, the main issues of substance are entrusted to popular 
opinion and current moral standards, thereby short-circuiting the exploration of whether justice and 
legitimacy should refer to general and everlasting principles, or to mere consensus. 5 
 
Following the Ordoliberal tradition
5, most economists tend to take it for granted 
that the recipes for economic prosperity and happiness are known: a mix of economic 
freedom (more or less rigorous enforcement of private property rights
6), redistribution 
for the sake of social fairness and tranquility, plus variable amounts of regulation, in 
accordance with the proponents’ convictions about the extent and relevance of the so-
called market failures. In particular, two possibilities have opened up. One is 
characterized by a neoclassical orientation. It focuses on the design and enforcement of 
the appropriate institutional context required to follow blueprints and to provide the 
necessary fine tuning. A second perspective is indebted to the classical-liberal tradition. 
Its supporters stop short of advocating extensive constructivist engagements. Instead, 
they tend to concentrate on the rule of law as the only relevant operational device and 
identify spontaneous evolution
7 as the engine leading to efficiency, fairness, and overall 
wealth. In particular, appropriate constitutional engineering is assumed to provide the 
meta-structure within which virtuous evolution unfolds and the rigor of the rule of law 
does not turn into abuse.  
Common to these two approaches  – detailed agency modeling and broad 
institutional design – are economists’ efforts to transform the evolutionary and the rule-
of-law questions into procedural issues, whereby deviations should be kept in check by 
better planning, more effective bureaus or voting mechanisms, suitable (economic-) 
constitutional means
8. Put differently, when coercive institutions fail to achieve the 
                                                 
5 Regrettably, the debt to authors like Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm (prominent among the founders of 
the Freiburg-based Ordoliberal  School) is seldom acknowledged. Nor is there much reference to the 
authors who first emphasized the importance of the connection between rules and economic performance, 
an intellectual debt that dates back to Adam Smith, if not earlier. 
6 Commons (1924, chapter 2) observed that tampering by the US courts with the actual meaning of 
private of property already had a distinguished record in the second half of the 19
th century, when private 
property was still considered uninfringeable. In particular the notion of the right to dispose of resources 
(goods and services) was replaced with the notion of the right to enjoy the purchasing power generated by 
the goods and services legitimately possessed. In the  US, the task of translating satisfaction into 
purchasing power was first entrusted to the legislative body (the Munn Case in 1873) and later to the 
judiciary (the Minnesota Rate Case in 1890). 
7 Evolutionary in the sense that social interaction is assumed to follow a virtuous process of adaptation, 
not to be confused with the meaning attributed by the evolutionary school, according to which individuals 
do not necessarily adjust their behavior to produce the most desirable social results.  
8 The adjective ‘economic’ refers to the approach, rather than to the outcome. In particular, economic 
constitutions tend to adopt a consequentialist view,  whereby meta-rules are engineered and evaluated 
according to their economic consequences, rather than according to their philosophical foundations or 
their moral principles. As will be pointed out later, this approach serves two purposes: it offers the 
possibility of suggesting an objective measurement of the quality of a legal system (e.g. by observing 
GDP per capita or GDP growth) and it encourages efforts to conceive a process of gradual change, from 6 
 
desirable objectives of economic prosperity and social cohesion, it is assumed that the 
rule-making process has g one awry, and that a new corset of rules and meta-rules is 
called for. These new rules might not succeed in forcing the rule-makers to behave in 
the most desirable way, but at least they are believed capable of restraining potential 
abuses. This is the essence of both constitutional economics and of its extended, neo-
classical-oriented counterpart – modern political economy.  
  The sections that follow will ignore the solution based on agency design. Such 
analysis would necessitate a case-by-case study of the policy objectives to be attained, 
which either requires the (hopeless) identification of a suitable social welfare function, 
or falls within the realm of law and economics, which is explored elsewhere. As for the 
constitutional alternative, we obviously discard situations where meta-rules are based on 
individual explicit or quasi explicit
9 consensus, for these are actually exchange 
agreements, or at most extended versions  of default contract law with opting-out 
clauses; certainly not constitutions. However, when explicit or quasi-explicit consensus 
is ruled out, we are able to raise two objections. First, we shall maintain that all 
meaningful constitutions do in fact rest largely on a set of arbitrary, non-accountable 
decisions. In particular, when based on a general social principle which subordinates the 
individual to the polis, then constitutions are in fact decrees defining the General Will. 
Second, we underscore that constitutions are made by human beings, most of whom are 
also responsible for ordinary law making. And those meta-rules, no matter how solemn 
and grandiose they sound, are enforced by other individuals, closely connected with the 
rule-makers. Either the latter appoint the former, or the former contemplate the 
possibility of becoming rule-makers themselves or of occupying positions that require 
approval by the rule-makers. This mixture is not without consequences. 
In fact, we posit that the only substantial differences between constitutional laws 
and ordinary laws are the historical events that justify the former and, once constitutions 
                                                                                                                                               
the current situation to a better one, with each discrete step being appreciated one at a time. That allows to 
do without intertemporal modeling and simply settle for easy-to-perform, ‘what-if’ exercises (groping).  
  Political constitutions present a much more differentiated gamut, but can be broadly grouped in two 
categories. Sometimes they are conceived as a barrier to prevent political abuse against individual rights 
(the American case); under different circumstances, they have a merely symbolic value, to mark the end 
of a political regime, with a list of desiderata the new class is supposed to pursue and attain (the French 
case). 
9 For the sake of argument that follows, we here assume that explicit consensus occurs when the 
individual overtly agrees to underwrite all the parts of a hypothetical social covenant. Quasi-explicit 
consensus applies when the social covenant is put into operation by default (tacit consent), but opting out 
is always possible at no costs. 7 
 
are introduced, what it takes to change them  – simple majorities vs. more stringent 
numerical requirements
10. Still, there is no a-priori reason to believe that laws approved 
by larger coalitions are better than others, or that they necessarily provide effective 
restraint. In order to assess whether constitutions are good or bad, one has to clarify 
what kind of ordinary law-making they are supposed to prevent or generate. To do so, 
one needs reference to everlasting principles. Relativism provides flexibility, but 
porousness at the same time. When a large number of robbers are involved in a crime, 
possibly on a massive scale, the crime is not necessarily transformed into a noble deed 
or into a tolerable evil just because it involves many aggressors and many victims. 
Redistribution and bailing out at the taxpayers’ expense a bankrupted large company are 
fitting contemporary examples, respectively. More realistically, it is easy to imagine 
that the larger the number of people required for approval, the greater the probability 
that the outcome turns out to be a set of vague platitudes, rather than effective barriers 
against abuse. In a sentence, unless they establish objective principles, virtuous meta-
rules are wishful thinking for the scholar, a valuable façade for the rule maker. 
The practical consequence is that the more stringent the majority requirements 
needed for change, the more likely it is that modifications are carried out by judicial 
interpretation, rather than through legislative processes. This can have advantages, if 
one believes that rule-making should be shielded from demagogic pressures. But the 
same argument can be used in the opposite direction, if one believes that in a democracy 
rules should reflect popular will, or that it is easier to appoint and influence a small 
number of Constitutional judges than large numbers in Parliament. 
 
The second part of this paper suggests a different, mainly explanatory approach 
to the features and dynamics of policy-making based on what we call ‘deep institutional 
                                                 
10 See also McGinnis-Rappaport (2007) for a detailed analysis of the virtues and shortcomings of super-
majority voting. 
   This is often considered to be a matter of substance, which provides stability to the rule-making system. 
Although this is obviously true, some qualifications are in order, since rule-makers have ways to 
circumvent majority or super-majority resistance, or to weaken its effectiveness, or to soften the 
constitutional watchdogs. For instance, the incumbent rulers might find it advantageous to act through the 
appointment of the members of the constitutional court, or by putting pressure on the ordinary judges, 
who may serve specific interest without necessarily betraying their own convictions. On the other hand, in 
modern democracies self-restraint by the incumbent winners (who can be future losers) may prove more 
powerful than super-majority rules. This does not mean that the rules last forever, but that proposals for 
change tend to be bipartisan and characterized by informal, non-written agreements, rather than 
confrontational. Examples along these lines are offered by the attempts to enact procedural reforms (e.g. 
electoral rules). 8 
 
changes’
11. The fundamental idea is that the grand principles characterizing a 
civilization and driving the institutional environment – rule-making and the reaction to 
rule making  – undergo fairly sporadic change through time. Put differently, the 
alterations in the ways social interaction is recognized and accepted by the members of 
a community vary through time as a consequence of ideological evolution. Of course, 
ideological developments are not sudden and their origins can be traced throughout 
decades and even centuries. However, it is here upheld that the translation of ideas into 
shared perceptions and norms takes place rather quickly and  is often the result of 
accidents, or of a combination of accidents: obvious examples are a famine, the 
presence of outstanding or extremely poor leaders, a war. Nothing, however, happens to 
the institutional context if there is a famine and only a famine.  Similarly, nothing 
happens if a revolutionary set of ideas is brought to the surface by brilliant intellectuals 
and effective popularizers, but the spark to ignite change is absent. By contrast, grand 
history may be born anew once the rise and spreading of new ideas coincide with a 
major accident – such as a war or a natural disaster – that forces people to look in new 
directions and seek new solutions. In such moments the perception of politics is also 
altered, with repercussion upon people’s beliefs about the nature of political action and 
ultimately expectations about policy-making.  
The periods of time defined by the deep institutional changes are named 
‘historical periods’. Common to all historical periods is the fact that policy-making 
remains driven by a single engine, the quest for authority and power; and that it is 
subject to two constraints: the ideological environment and the available technology. It 
is therefore maintained that all the rest, including evolutionary selection processes or 
other path-dependence mechanisms, plays a secondary role or perhaps no role at all.  
With this ultimate goal in mind, section 3. critically reviews the constitutional 
approach, while section 4. discusses the notion of deep institutional change as a way to 
explore t he nature and working of meta-principles. Section 5. compares the deep-
institutional-change thesis with the institutional and the evolutionary views and section 
6. concludes by developing a cautious agenda to test the implications and predictions of 
the various propositions. 
                                                 
11 As a matter of fact, the normative implications of our approach are not negligible, in that it excludes the 
viability of ‘rational’, efficiency-based or efficiency-enhancing policy-making. Instead, it suggests that 
those who want to alter the scope of policy-making, or change its nature, act in order to bring about ‘deep 
institutional changes’. 9 
 
 
3.    Social contracts for policy making 
As aired in the previous section, today’s political economy investigates the mechanics 
of politics by relying on the modeling tools typical of modern neoclassical economics, 
thereby making deliberate use of extremely simplified assumptions and ultimately 
leaving economic reasoning in the background
12. Its ultimate aim is to design the rules 
of the game required  to reduce the impact of rents and rent-seeking structures on 
efficiency and growth. No serious effort is undertaken to investigate the ideological or 
moral foundation of the rule-making systems. Hence, the nature of the bond which 
keeps together rulers and citizens is taken for granted (and thus ignored), while research 
focuses on analyzing how rule-makers interact to share and maintain power, on 
assessing what kind of economic consequences the various idealized patterns of 
interaction are likely to generate in an allegedly value-free environment
13, on testing the 
effectiveness of distinct governance options to create incentives for allegedly virtuous 
rule making and rule enforcement.  
A different and possibly more interesting approach from the speculative 
standpoint is offered by the ‘new contractarians’, a group we consider to be 
synonymous with ‘Constitutionalists’. Their view suggests that although the principle of 
atheistic democracy
14 is an adequate foundation for a political system consistent with 
the classical-liberal standpoint, economic policy-making also requires meta-rules, which 
define the boundaries of state action and avoid or restrain abuse by the rulers. The 
foundations of such meta-rules are thus spelled out in a new version of the social 
contract, the analysis of which forms the object of the present section. 
The reason for concentrating on the constitutional contract is that it currently 
represents one of the two credible attempts to develop a system of principles in favor of 
policy-making – the other one being the Law-and-Economics vision (or part of it). In a 
                                                 
12 See for instance Weingast and Wittman (2006), who characterize political economy as a technique, 
rather than as a subject matter: “the theory is based in mathematics (often game theoretic), and the 
empirics either use sophisticated statistical techniques or involve experiments where money is used as a 
motivating force in the experiment” (p.4). 
13 See Lewis (1944/2001, chapter 2) for the contradictions typical of all efforts to evaluate results in a 
context where Natural Law or First Principles are excluded.  




15 contend that under certain circumstances, the 
state can legitimately encroach upon individual rights, even without explicit consent. 
Legitimacy to do so is based on the implicit/tacit social contract, through which the 
individual has passively accepted the authority of the state. The tacit option is made 
acceptable by the fact that the content of the contract is such that the individual would 
never abstain from accepting it, if given a chance to express his opinion. That is why an 
explicit contract is redundant and the cost of obtaining it can thus be ignored. If this 
presumption is agreed to, then coercive action would not conflict with a free-market 
context and it would also avoid the post-Millian tradition’s slide into utilitarianism. That 
explains why this claim has appealed both to those who believe that government 
intervention is excessive and to those who cherish the idea of good government, but do 
not like to be accused of disguised socialism.  
The presumption of tacit agreement comes in two versions, depending upon the 
content of the silent pact between the individual and the authority. One version can be 
defined as Constitutional stricto sensu and will be examined below. The other is the 
quasi-minimal thesis and will be discussed in the subsequent sub-section.  
 
Questioning the Constitutional contract 
According to the Constitutional version, current institutions have been designed or 
inherited by actors who have rents to preserve and who therefore try their best to 
prevent a virtuous evolutionary path from running its course. This explains why we live 
in a bad world and not much is being done to move toward a better state of affairs. 
Thus, in order for people to agree on a social structure, the ground must initially be 
cleared from pre-existing power structures that de facto make it impossible to agree on a 
social covenant among equals (non-equal meaning conditioned by the past). This rent-
free environment where the ideal (tacit) covenant takes place is characterized by a ‘veil 
of (Knightian) uncertainty’
16, behind which people agree on the meta-rules that define a 
                                                 
15 See for instance Hayek (1960), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Brennan and Buchanan (1985, ch. 2) and 
Jasay (1992).  
16 We classify the lack of certainty in three groups. Risk indicates a situation where the individual knows 
what might happen and knows the probability distribution of the event. For instance, we know that by 
tossing a coin there is a 50% head probability and a 50% tail probability. Knightian uncertainty refers to a 
situation where the range of possible events is known, but their probability distribution is unknown. 
Future stock prices are an example. Pure uncertainty refers to the lack of k nowledge about events 
(guessing does not count). For instance, we do not know how we shall be producing energy in 300 years 
from now. 11 
 
society. Of course, implicit in this statement is the belief that absent consolidated rent-
seeking, the individuals would spontaneously choose the ‘best’ system of meta-rules, 
which would in turn eliminate or drastically limit the possibility of having bad norms. 
This spontaneous optimal choice taking place in a world without a past is the 
constitutional, tacit, social contract.  
In particular, the veil of uncertainty does not deny that rents might be created, 
but it ensures that the meta-rules are agreed-upon and enforced before any individual 
has had a chance to create or enjoy privileges. In order to identify these meta-rules, the 
following thought-experiment is suggested. Suppose that a group of individuals came to 
earth with no past (i.e. no rents), had to decide whether to form a community and 
debated about the rules that should characterize such a community. Most likely, their 
fundamental choice would regard the amount of rent-seeking that the social rules of the 
game to be would allow. In order to make his choice, each potential member of the 
community would then rationally evaluate his/her chances of successful rent-seeking in 
a future society. Every individual knows what the world out there looks like and has 
some notion about his likely positioning in such a world (Knightian uncertainty does not 
mean ignorance). Nonetheless, he is assumed to be unable to assess his chances for rent-
seeking and, more generally, his ability to exploit the opportunities that life may offer, 
or the probability of suffering from failure. This inability is greater, the longer the time 
horizon. As a result, if the constitutional features are to extend over a long-distance 
future in order to enhance stability, and if the constitutional meta-rules are abstract 
enough (i.e., they consist of very general principles about what rulers can and cannot 
do), uncertainty makes sure that risk-neutral or even mildly risk-loving individuals opt 
for a system of constitutional norms that severely restricts the ruler’s decision-making 
power
17. In other words, behind such a veil, individuals believe that their expected rent-
                                                 
17 A different (and equally popular) kind of contract has been conceived in Rawls (1971). Contrary to the 
classical liberal tradition, however, Rawls posits that the authority is entitled to act by presuming that the 
individual chooses behind a veil of ignorance, has no hope to be the architect of his own future and 
therefore to achieve his goals by engaging in hard work and entrepreneurial activities.  
   Despite its name and contrary to Rawls’s claim, however, this is not a contract, let alone a fair contract, 
for in the Rawlsian world the ruler de facto prevents individuals from engaging in social activities unless 
they accept to behave as if they were ignorant, both about the world to be and about their own abilities. 
Put differently, Rawls’s intellectual experiment is a presumption about individual behavior formulated by 
the ruler in order to justify his own discretionary action. Rather than a contract, it looks like a self-serving 
argument, though a Rawlsian could respond to this criticism by arguing that the approach can only be 
attacked by those who have broken through the veil of ignorance and therefore have distanced themselves 
from a fair starting point. 12 
 
seeking gains are significantly negative, so that even the risk-loving members of the 
society are inclined to subscribe to a constitutional rule that prevents rent-seeking and 
sets substantial limits to the regulatory and spending/taxing power of the state
18.  
Two sets of comments are in order. First, this line of reasoning rests on critical 
assumptions about – for instance – the probability of winning the rent-seeking game, 
which declines as rent-seeking becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
elites, which affects the bearing of the risk-aversion element; the profitability of rent-
seeking; the sustainability of rent-seeking (if the rent-seeking opportunities are 
periodically randomly redistributed, there is not much reason to strive to create 
privileges and appropriate them)
19. 
Second, it is equally clear that within the Constitutional framework the role of 
the state has nothing to do with the protection of fundamental rights (e.g. natural rights), 
since the existence of fundamental, objective rights is explicitly denied
20. No ethical 
component enters the contractarian picture: the social agreement is sovereign and ruled 
by moral relativism. Even the notion of justice takes an unusual meaning, for ‘just’ no 
longer reflects compliance with principles, but is made equivalent to submission to the 
agreed-upon meta-rules. Therefore, consensus prevails upon ethics in three different 
ways: (1) when the tacit agreement behind the veil of uncertainty defines the meta-rules, 
so that justice is ultimately the content of such meta-rules; (2) when justice acquires a 
normative dimension, in that ‘just’ is what eliminates contradictions among possibly 
                                                                                                                                               
   Of course, the problem with the Rawlsian theory is that one’s vision of the world cannot be labeled 
unfair just because it rejects the logical non sequitur whereby fairness necessarily implies blindness and 
possibly also inaction. It happens that the only rationale for the Rawlsian position is based on the 
assumption that individual qualities are distributed at random by some superior authority who dispenses 
his gifts to societies, rather than to individuals. Thus, nobody can object to redistribution, for those talents 
are in fact social property, not individual’s property. Of course, the counterargument can take different 
shapes: (1) why should intellectual and physical features be redistributed only among human being and 
not include animals? (2) how do we know that the superior authority gave away gifts randomly in the 
expectation that we carry out redistribution? (3) how do we know that it all comes from a superior 
authority? 
18 Brennan and Buchanan (1985: 55) define this attitude as “quasi-risk aversion”.  
19 At first sight one might wonder why the contractarian view must go to such lengths to imagine a veil of 
uncertainty. Yet, there is no other way. One cannot simply outlaw rent-seeking per se without referring to 
some moral standard outside the realm of individual choice. For instance, if one maintained that rent-
seeking is unacceptable because it is based on coercive norms that restrict the individual’s freedom to 
choose, one should accept the principle of unrestricted personal freedom and give up a claim to an amoral 
social covenant. Similarly, it cannot be claimed that people agree on a social contract without knowing 
where they would end up unless the veil is lifted, for this would in fact be Rawls’s pseudo-contract. 
20 See for instance Brennan and Buchanan (1985: 22). 13 
 
conflicting rules
21; (3) when the object of politics is established, and the role of the state 
is ultimately understood to be the production and financing of collective goods, even 
when this may imply encroachment upon individual liberties so as to avoid ‘major’ 
damages to other parties. 
In this light, we posit that the constitutional perspective suffers from two 
weaknesses. One is logical, the other operational. From a logical standpoint, the main 
problem is the role of the veil of uncertainty as mainstay of an agreement on the meta-
rules. Even if one accepts the veil as realistic, the existence of such an agreement can 
only be imagined, for individuals are not identical and therefore  – contrary to the 
constitutional view – they do not necessarily share the same wishes with regard to the 
way a society should be run and state intervention restricted. For instance, some might 
want the state to protect the individual from coercion; others might claim that coercive 
taxation is tolerable to relieve poverty or to compensate people from natural or 
‘systemic’ catastrophes; still other groups might f avor equalitarian redistribution no 
matter what. Hence the tacit contract would not be too far away from an exercise in 
figuring out how a typical individual imagined by the social scientist would behave and 
what he would choose. To be fair, the Constitutional response would be that the tacit 
contract is in fact a residual contract, in that it identifies the body of meta-rules from 
which nobody has opted out
22. This is hardly convincing, though. On the one hand, one 
could therefore conclude that the Constitutional state is not a real state, but only an 
agency that provides services on demand to those who want to buy protection, 
redistribution, fairness, etc.. On the other hand, if the state that emerges from the social 
contract maintains its standard monopolistic prerogatives, it is hard to see how one can 
opt out of a set of rules that does not allow competing systems to come to the surface. 
For instance, can one opt out of a state educational system if all private education is 
                                                 
21 This notion of justice is not entirely new, of course. See for instance Dworkin (1986), who claims that 
the law is just because it creates a social order. Hence, the moral dimension is the ability to create 
consensus and eliminate inconsistencies. It seems that the difference between Dworkin’s ‘interpretive 
view’ and the Constitutional view lies in the legal space where consensus is to be reached. According to 
the former such a space is not restricted and includes both meta- and ordinary rules, whereas according to 
the latter the emphasis is on the potential conflicts among meta-rules only. 
22 The constitutional contractarian perspective explicitly states that consensus can be assumed by default 
if an individual takes part in social life while having the possibility of opting out (see Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985, chapter 7). Do they really mean that after having written a registered letter to the 
President, one can stop paying taxes? Despite Buchanan’s very critical attitude towards the role of the 
state in modern societies, we believe that his failure to opt out is not to due to fear of President Obama’s 
reaction, but rather because he does not really consider it would be consistent with his own constitutional 
context, which is also the only legitimate context he recognizes. 14 
 
outlawed or severely restricted in a given territory? Or can one build his own house on 
his own piece of land after having rejected a law that prescribes that building permits 
are compulsory for all activities in the construction industry? Surely, one could object 
that these two examples refer to ordinary laws, rather than to meta-rules. It should be 
observed, however, that if meta-rules are not about absolute moral principles, then they 
are necessarily about objectives to be attained through ordinary legislation. Changing 
the required majority for approval does not transform an ordinary norm into a meta-rule. 
At most, it changes the decision-maker, as pointed out earlier. 
In short, it seems that the purpose of the Constitutional state is to legislate more 
or less at will, and then allow the members of a society (as defined by the state?) to 
decide whether they like the various pieces of legislation or whether they would like to 
opt out. Not only would this be hardly manageable from an operational standpoint, but 
it would lose all its ‘constitutional’ content. Put differently, either the state no longer 
exists (for a state without absolute power to enforce its rules is no longer a state)
23, or its 
meta-rules drop their distinctive meaning and are reduced to a mere façade. 
From the operational vantage point,  the constitutional proposal does deserve 
credit for not attempting to design an optimal set of meta-rules ex novo or to engage in 
constructivist experiments, but ‘merely’ to reform the institutional context in 
democracies, where all individuals are allowed to express their views. However 
attractive this may appear, the difficulties remain daunting. For in order to unleash a 
constitutional evolutionary process, individuals must be pushed back behind the veil of 
uncertainty, be reduced to the typical agent so as to make sure that they all share the 
same notion of the collective good, and/or their time horizon should be stretched 
considerably. Otherwise, individuals would be fully aware of their chances to acquire 
privileges and would raise the cost the losers would face by opting out, or even prevent 
them from doing so.  
To conclude, the Constitutional contract would be not only hard to enforce, but 
also difficult to rationalize in the very light of the (questionable) constitutional notion of 
justice, which is  defined according to the prevailing rules, rather than to general 
principles outside man-made legislation. Then, in order for the constitutional project to 
                                                 
23 Instead, the state would become either an insurance company (among many others, with no monopoly 
power, let alone on violence), or an advanced stationer’s shop where one can buy pre-printed contracts, 
possibly with a guarantee of enforcement provided by the stationer himself, either by default or on 
demand. 15 
 
see the light, the accent would have to be on revolution rather than on reform. 
Nonetheless, even if the Constitutionalists were happy with revolutions (which is not 
the case), revolutions are by nature teleological, which means that some kind of 
constructivist engagement is unavoidable; or that First Principles (objectivism) must be 
accepted. Still, both of these propositions run against the very claims of the 
constitutional vision. 
 
Doubts on the quasi-minimal contract 
Jasay’s quasi minimal approach
24 was conceived as a response to the classical-liberal 
view derived from John Stuart Mill, according to whom the state is legitimized to act in 
order to prevent individuals from being harmed. This classical-liberal, almost 
Hobbesian statement, however, supports two deceptively convincing concepts of 
liberty: freedom from damage (as maintained by J.S. Mill himself) and freedom to 
follow the rule of law (F. von Hayek). Both are open definitions, in that they offer much 
room to interpretation and have ultimately become rather porous. Thanks to J.S. Mill 
himself, for instance, freedom from damage has become the right not to suffer as a 
result of the actions of other members of the community. The Hayekian definition goes 
in the same direction in that the rule of law is meant to protect the individual from other 
people’s misbehavior. In fact, both definitions generate a full range of questions, and are 
far from settling the issue. For in both cases it all comes to defining and interpreting the 
border between encroaching upon one’s legitimate rights (which requires action) and 
suffering from indirect effects (which doesn’t).   
                                                 
24 See Jasay (1992), who calls his approach ‘strict liberalism’. Of course, Jasay is neither the father, nor 
the only advocate of the quasi-minimal state. For instance, Mises was also arguing in the same vein 
decades ago and Holcombe (2004) has made the case once again in more recent times. However, Mises 
and Holcombe justify the state as a burden to endure, lest worse situations materialize (chaos or rival 
bandits fighting for short-term rent-seeking); and express hope, rather than confidence, that the state does 
not abuse its powers and stays small. On the other hand, Jasay focuses on the allegedly contractual nature 
of the quasi-minimal state and therefore gives its existence a moral justification, rather than referring to 
mere expediency. 
   To complete the argument, it is worth mentioning that the minimal proposal  differs from what we 
define as the quasi-minimal version, in that while the latter does not rule out that the state performing 
some economic functions, the former aims at restricting the role of the state to the protection of physical 
integrity (Hobbes) and of private property rights (Locke). Hence, it is actually closer to the views typical 
of the Secular centuries, to be explained in the next section. The minimal proposal, however, will not be 
further explored in these pages. 16 
 
This shift of emphasis, away from the traditional idea of freedom-from-coercion, 
had been noted long ago by the old institutionalists
25 and has in fact gradually led to the 
crisis of the classical-liberal framework, which has lost much of its identity by engaging 
in hopeless fights over interpretation and hair-splitting. Confusion and ambiguities have 
followed. For instance, liberty as the right not to suffer damage inevitably imposes 
limitations on the others’ freedom of action; whereas liberty as the ability to follow 
procedurally correct rule-making, not unlike what we have already observed in the 
constitutional case, leads to a notion of  justice (and legitimacy) equivalent to 
compliance with the rules, a conclusion that not every classical-liberal brought up in the 
Scottish tradition would subscribe to. 
Jasay is very clear about the classical-liberal ambiguity and rightly believes that 
neither damage avoidance, nor Dewey’s pragmatic moral philosophy
26 are sound bases 
to justify violations of the freedom-from-coercion principle. Instead, he claims that 
since the state can only be the expression of the will of a community (as opposed to the 
will of God, let alone of an autocrat), the state can only be founded on a contractarian 
approach. In particular, in Jasay’s view the typical feature of a legitimate contract is its 
ability to originate Pareto-improvements, whereby none of the agents involved is made 
worse off in comparison with the situation prevailing before the contract is signed and 
put in force. All actions or policies enforced by the state are then subject to the same 
validation criterion. In addition, and contrary to the Constitutional perspective, the 
quasi-minimal approach has moral foundations. They are individual liberty from 
coercion, as mentioned earlier; and private property based on possession, unless 
possession is derived from violence or fraud (both circumstances being of course 
departures from the personal-freedom principle).  
The quasi-minimal proposal is attractive, in that it contains neither implicit and 
possibly questionable assumptions about the individuals’ attitude towards risk, nor 
arbitrary and less than plausible conjectures about the nature and dynamic features of 
rent-seeking. In addition, the political construction Jasay envisages does not necessarily 
depend on religion and thus on concepts that require the existence and acceptance of a 
divine order. The emphasis is actually on the secular version of the natural-right 
approach, which rests upon the concept that each individual is born a free man, which in 
                                                 
25 See for instance Commons (1924). 
26 See Dewey (1934) and Dougherty (2000, chapters 4 and 7) for a synthetic critical analysis. 17 
 
turn implies that  nobody can uphold any right on the newly-born creature
27. This is 
indeed all one needs to postulate in order to develop an argument based on natural 
rights. In this particular case, the nature-based claim to freedom rules out the right to 
exercise physical aggression, and thus the duty for the victim to accept it or to negotiate 
compromises within the social body.  
It then follows that when it comes to formulating sets of formal rules in order to 
discipline social interaction, the role of the state actually becomes a matter of individual 
choice. It is up to the individual to decide whether and under which conditions to 
engage in trading with the rest of the community (one or more individuals), how to act 
or not to act in certain ways while obtaining goods or valuable behavioral commitments 
by his counterpart(s), how to choose an enforcing agent. Since no exchange would take 
place voluntarily without at least one party being better off, and with none of the parties 
being worse off, Jasay’s  Paretian social contract is indeed moral (i.e. ‘just’ in the 
traditional way) and persuasive. 
Still, the quasi-minimal contract also presents a number of unresolved issues. On 
the one hand, it depends on the a-priori general recognition of an alleged man-centered 
natural right (individual freedom), which is indeed readily enough conceived, but not 
necessarily accepted by everybody. For instance, one can also argue for a natural-right 
vision based on the social nature of man. If moral (and therefore just) is what leads to 
the realization of human nature, and the human being is supposed to realize himself 
only in the social context, then freedom is subject to what is needed for the individual to 
be part in a social context, which of course necessarily requires that the nature and goals 
of a virtuous society must be defined in advance. Hence, two possibilities open up. 
Either the individualistic notion of freedom is rejected, which would however imply the 
downfall of the Paretian-optimality constraint on the quasi-minimal social contract. Or, 
one upholds the strict individualistic line, but at the cost of undermining the very notion 
of a social contract, which would be in fact reduced to a set of individual agreements 
(voluntary exchange) to do or not to do.  
Indeed, and this is a second point, one wonders whether state interference 
legitimized by Pareto optimality needs any coercion at all. If the answer is negative, 
                                                 
27 See for instance Hohfeld (1923). An alternative option is aired in Lewis (1944/2001, Appendix), who 
identifies a system of Natural Laws based on a set of traditions shared by different civilizations. Such 
Laws are Beneficence, Duties to the Family, Good Faith, Mercy, Valor. 18 
 
then there is no reason to have a state enjoying the monopoly of violence and the power 
to use it. Furthermore, and from a broader standpoint, one may wonder whether Pareto 
optimal deals are indeed suitable to legitimize a social contract. In theory, one may 
welcome an agent that reduces the cost of carrying out business. But of course this is 
not enough to justify monopoly power, and even less the use of violence. Put 
differently, Jasay’s quasi-minimal contract is really a standard contract. Calling the 
counterpart ‘the state’ makes no difference, especially if one deprives the states of its 
main prerogatives (monopoly of violence and impunity when infringing upon individual 
liberty). 
Equally important, one should also solve the practical problem of designating 
those in charge of assessing whether a given course of action is actually conducive to a 
Pareto improvement. The standard literature sidesteps the question by referring to the 
existence of public and collective goods: it does not really matter who is in charge as 
long as he takes care of producing the necessary public and collective goods and gets 
punished or removed if he fails to do so, or does it at an exceedingly high cost. But 
definitions are not enough from a subjectivist standpoint. Public goods require that the 
non-rivalry and the non-excludability criteria apply. Still, the very fact that an 
individual might consume goods or services without affecting the scarcity constraint 
others are facing, and that the producer is not able to detect who is actually consuming 
(and how much), is not a reason to tax the individual and force him to pay the (fixed) 
costs of production. In other words, even in a world characterized by a quasi-minimal 
social contract, discretionary/arbitrary power is required to guess both the amount of 
presumed consumption and the subjective value associated with such an activity
28. By 
doing so, one necessarily violates individual freedom. Claiming or guessing that the 
victim (the taxpayer in this case) is actually free-riding makes little difference to the 
essence of the question
29. Envy is hardly a good enough reason to generate a 
presumption of fraud and thereby ‘legitimize’ intrusion. 
                                                 
28 It remains to be assessed whether public goods really exist, i.e. whether such a condition relates to the 
nature of the good or service (zero marginal cost of production), or to the technology of property-right 
enforcement (excludability). In fact, crucial to the argument is that excludability is about detection: if an 
individual consumes good X in ways that violate his agreement with the seller (e.g. photocopying a 
book), he is not taking advantage of a public good, but of weak enforcement abilities. 
29 The pure free rider is not really doing anything immoral, for he is not encroaching upon anybody’s 
liberty. If anything, he might be cheating, for he might be consuming against the producer’s will, while 
denying doing so. But of course, if we were able to prove that the individual is actually lying, then the 
non-excludability criterion would be violated and it would no longer be a public good. 19 
 
The case for the so-called collective goods
30 would of course be even weaker, 
for in this case the very definition of collective good depends on the ruler, who may of 
course have his own ideas about what is good for society, what should be provided by 
the state and at what conditions. From that vantage point, and contrary to the primary 
design of the advocates of the quasi-minimal state, the Pareto criterion might thus turn 
out to be the key to legitimize discretion, rather than to delegitimize extended 
government intervention. 
Finally, and similar to the Constitutional case, one might object that this is 
actually a proposal for revolution, where change requires starting from scratch, rather 
than for reform, where the starting point is the current given context. Clearly, if the 
appropriate size of the state is defined by incremental steps based on the Pareto-
optimality criterion, the experiment can only start from a situation in which there is no 
state. Downsizing a large state would go nowhere, unless nobody was enjoying rents, 
which is wishful thinking. The only way out would then be a ‘what if’ exercise behind 
some sort of veil, which however would meet objections not unlike those already raised 
earlier on within the constitutional context. 
 
4.  Deep change and historical periods in Western civilization 
The preliminary conclusion of the argument developed so far is that the foundations of 
economic policy-making are logically weak, unless one is ready to identify and able to 
justify the notion of social welfare. This possibility has been here denied. In particular, 
modern social-contract theory offers little help, for either these theories boil down to 
academic what-if exercises based on questionable assumptions, or they actually refer to 
the state as an entity which has little to do with the traditional state, and thus would 
have no power to enforce policies.  
As previously  suggested, a different and perhaps more fruitful way to consider 
the legitimacy of today’s policy making is to take for granted that the large majority of 
                                                 
30 It is far from clear what economists understand under the label of ‘collective good’. Nonetheless, it is 
generally acknowledged that this category identifies excludable goods that are necessary for the existence 
of social interaction and/or represent shared values (e.g. access to health or education for everybody) that 
private suppliers fail to offer at the socially desirable conditions. Put differently, their existence depends 
either on the idea whereby there is no freedom outside the appropriate social context (defined through a 
given procedure), and/or on the existence of market failures combined with the presence of a social 
welfare function and the absence of substantial government failures.  20 
 
the population does support substantial government intervention in most areas of 
economic activities, and therefore to put a different type of question. Rather than asking 
‘how can one churn better rules’, or ‘what is the optimal size of legitimate government’, 
we suggest raising the question of ‘what makes government intervention perceived to be 
legitimate’.  
The answer we provide revolves around the notion of the historical period, 
which spans from one moment of deep institutional change to another. Each historical 
period is characterized by a distinctive, general perception of the rules of social 
interaction. A modification in these perceptions may lead to new procedures to 
designate the agents in charge of enforcing the agreed-upon coordination devices 
(including contracts), to select those responsible for producing rules, goods and services 
on behalf and to the benefit of the community, and also to determine how desirable 
‘collective’ services are identified and paid for. When so, deep institutional change (i.e. 
change in the shared perceptions) coincides or brings about political transformation and 
a new historical period begins. 
This does not ignore that constitutions exist, but it emphasizes that the content of 
a constitutional framework is defined or at least heavily influenced by what a political 
body of people – a small community, a nation, an empire – believes to be acceptable
31. 
It also encourages those interested in exploring the constitutional and institutional 
environment of a period to pay particular attention to the features of the historical 
phases under scrutiny, which are here assumed to be far less dynamic than commonly 
believed. In particular, it is here maintained that within each of the three historical 
periods defining Western civilization to be presented in some detail in this section, the 
rules of the game did not adjust following any recognizable evolutionary pattern 
(contrary to the path-dependence thesis), and that efforts to innovate through 
constitutional law-making are bound to be vain (contrary to the constitutional-
economics literature). Top-down projects are successful only insofar as they reflect the 
shared ideologies of the given historical moment. Thus, they are a byproduct of their 
time, rather than an innovation per se. This does not exclude that constitutions can bring 
about or ease change. But when successful, even their innovativeness springs from a 
                                                 
31 History abounds with cases in which such changes took place in the absence of written constitutions, as 
in 18
th century continental Europe; and also with situations in which constitutions were left intact 
throughout rather dramatic periods, as in Italy between 1848 and 1946, a time span during which the 
country definitely did not offer a homogenous institutional environment. 21 
 
certain context, and not ‘any’ context would do. On the other hand, proposals relying on 
a bottom-up approach tend to share the weaknesses of the contractarian approach 
examined in the previous section. 
Our thesis is that the history of Western Civilization can be split into three 
periods: the Gregorian Centuries, the Secular Period, the Age of Social Responsibility. 
To each of them specific grand rules of the game can be attached, which might help 
understand why economic policy-making became an issue only towards the end of the 
second period and why it developed into a major component of societal interaction only 
in the last. 
 
The Gregorian Centuries 
There is a general tendency to locate the birth of the West
32 in the High Middle Ages, 
more or less when ancient political philosophy  – stoicism in particular  – met 
Christianity
33 and a number of simmering questions were put on the table. By and large 
all such questions converged onto two basic issues: defining the legitimacy of political 
authority, and establishing the purpose and the boundaries of political power. The result 
of the debate – which for some decades actually meant bitter conflict – was a body of 
shared values usually referred to as ‘the Gregorian Revolution’ (late 11
th century). Such 
values were critical to the formation of the West, for they identified the ‘true’ source of 
power and authority, the relationship between the authority and the rest of the 
community, the role of each individual within the community. For the purposes of the 
present discussion, we call these features the first deep institutional change in the West, 
which marked the beginning of the first historical period of our civilization, lasting for 
some 600 years. 
The Gregorian Revolution takes its name after Pope Gregory VII, who in 1075 
AD challenged the primacy of the secular ruler by issuing the ‘Dictates of the Pope’, a 
                                                 
32 True enough, the literature refers to many West’s, e.g. the Hellenistic, the Classical, the Modern. For 
the sake of simplicity we shall henceforth refer to the West as to the ‘modern West’, that is to a 
civilization based on the notions of individual responsibility, equal dignity and of advancement by the use 
of reason, separate from faith (hence, the secular separate from the religious).  
33 As in any societal system, the Western context defines the role of the individual in a community. That 
involves the definitions of the relevant set of constraints and therefore also the nature and origin of the 
legitimate rules: “True law, Cicero taught, is right consonant with nature, available to all, constant and 
eternal … common to God and man … The state is nothing more or less than a partnership in law, an 
assemblage of men associated in consent to law. […] Christianity taught that man is the creature of God, 
… brotherhood of man became the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God” (Dougherty 2000: 
13-14). 22 
 
declaration that disavowed a long tradition whereby the Emperor was recognized as the 
supreme authority in both religious and secular matters
34. In order to reach his goal, 
Gregory VII had to raise the question of legitimate power. As a matter of fact, the 
outcome was already secured as soon as the very issue of legitimacy became open for 
debate, since all the parties concerned acknowledged that the answer could only come 
from the notions of natural order and Divine Will on the one hand, and from the 
assessment of the nature and goals of the individual within society on the other.  
In addition, the Emperor had to accept the change in the rules of the game 
imposed by Gregory VII and his successors for one very practical reason. Until the 11
th 
century, the secular sovereign was a barbaric ruler: rather than ruling, however, he 
would act as coordinator of a more or less large number of tribes. They would share the 
same religious faith (a very soft and accommodating version of Christianity) and be 
forced to cooperate in order to oppose attacks from outside (Magyars, Normans, Arabs). 
The only way to show sovereign power was thus leadership in battle and the only 
tangible sign of civilian rule was the somewhat symbolic right to administer justice 
(even Charles the Great was traveling from one corner to the other of his domain to this 
purpose, thereby making sure he would still recognized as the current ruler). As we 
know, the substantial decline of threats from outside Europe, the increase in wealth that 
followed, and thus urbanization, led to a situation where the Emperor became de facto 
redundant militarily, while the prevailing version of Christendom w as not enough to 
make him necessary as the head of a religious structure: bishops and monasteries were 
more than enough to meet believers’ needs. In a word, the Emperor had to rely on the 
Church in order to legitimize his power and to give a meaning to his role
35. Destroying 
the Church would have been suicidal. 
The most important result of the Gregorian Revolution was the birth of the law 
(Berman, 1983). Both the Church and the Empire were forced to recognize the existence 
of rules, embedded in the Divine Order, discovered by reason and revealed by God, to 
                                                 
34 Prior to the Gregorian revolution the Emperor had the right to the title of Vicar of Christ, while the 
Pope was some kind of super-bishop (the Vicar of Saint Peter), all other bishops being appointed and de 
facto controlled by the Emperor. The West had to wait until Pope Innocent III (early 13
th century) for an 
exclusive papal claim to the supreme title. 
35 The Emperor played also a third function, which has sometimes been overlooked by the literature. 
Given the semi-tribal composition of the empire, the local princes needed to coordinate their activities in 
order to give each other support in case of domestic revolt. The Emperor actually acted as the 
coordinating agency of this system of personal alliances. As the tribal features faded, the prince had to 
rely on other sources of legitimacy, such as the supra-natural.  23 
 
which all secular and religious authorities were subject: ‘rule by law and under the law’. 
Other important outcomes were the notion of equality of all individuals before God, to 
whom we are individually responsible; and the teleological view whereby the individual 
has come into this world with a purpose, which is/was living according to God’s Will 
(i.e. in compliance with the Divine Order) while preparing for death. In other words, all 
individuals are children of God, who loves all men equally. But all God’s children have 
to accept the earthly order as sacred and immutable, for it is the expression of God’s 
will.   
One can of course debate at length on the details of how the belief structure of 
the Gregorian society came about, but there is little doubt that those mentioned above 
were actually the foundations of all Western early social structures:  
(1) equality with respect to God, but passive recognition of God-designed social 
hierarchy and inequalities in this world,  
(2) the existence of ‘just’ rules, either conceived by God or by man, but 
nevertheless consistent with God’s design – in case of conflict, just rules were to prevail 
over habit and tradition;  
(3) the partition between a secular and a religious world (against universalism). 
This does not mean that nothing within these social structures changed. 
Nonetheless, institutional innovations were the results of the greater wealth produced by 
a combination of some technological progress, less warfare, extensive colonization of 
new lands; and/or by the quest for power, which often implied the creation of rents 
preserved by violence. It was not a question of path dependence or evolution, but rather 
of expanded opportunity sets that could have presented different features if some battles 
had ended differently, if famines or diseases had struck harder or not struck at all, if the 
world had not warmed up significantly at the beginning of the second millennium AD.  
Put differently, the Gregorian Revolution articulated the concept that policy was 
a race for power, and that all secular authority is fragile. Power could be expanded and 
authority secured through exploitation. Of course, at the time there could be no room for 
a social contract, for the contract was not between the ruler and the subjects, but 
between the ruler and those who were supposed to confirm divine appointment and 
consent
36. This also explains why policy-making tended to be directed towards the 
                                                 
36 The Gregorian time does present us with allegedly constitutional documents, the best known of which 
are perhaps the Great Charter of León (1017), the Magna Carta (1215), the Golden Bull (1222). All these 24 
 
acquisition of more and more resources, and therefore towards the expansion in 
territorial claims: to consolidate authority and preempt potential rivals and aggressors.  
To conclude, since rulers were not chosen by anybody, but appointed by a divine 
agent, in Gregorian times the development of coercive, pragmatic institutions were 
functional to the interests of the ruling rent-seekers. In the early Gregorian centuries, 
when power could be exercised by relatively small armies of highly trained specialists 
facing equally small armies, rent-seeking was very basic: the ruler would grab what was 
available, possibly restrained by the religious authorities, and be held responsible to 
God only. In later periods, military technology (the introduction of artillery and fire 
arms) made it easier for competitors to challenge incumbents
37 and more sophisticated 
(and expensive) arrangements had to be elaborated. Sometimes, this led to the creation 
of the bureaucratic state, so as to improve control over the territory (Philippe Auguste 
was the major early innovator in this field); sometimes to alliances with the affluent 
elites, either when money was needed, or when centralized control was ineffective. In 
turn, there were situations when the elites were affluent enough to maintain or buy their 
independence, which meant that anointed rulers abstained from claiming rights on 
certain portions of territory
38. In yet different environments, the elites bought or 
acquired privileges (freedoms) and rent-seeking capacity (the case of the guilds is 
typical, but not unique). Indeed, one can figure out so many different path-dependent or 
evolutionary processes that one wonders whether these notions actually carry a useful 
operational content. 
 
The Secular Period 
The Gregorian revolution had indeed marked the separation between the secular and the 
religious world, but the fact that God had remained the sovereign source of authority 
                                                                                                                                               
were, however, concessions made by a weak king to the aristocracy, with very little ‘social’ or 
‘contractual’ content. They consisted of a list of freedoms (in fact privileges) that had little to do with the 
notion of liberty as this term came to be understood in later centuries. 
37 Of course, the army had nothing or little to do with the protection of the population. On the contrary, its 
purpose was to control the territories owned by the ruler – to prevent revolt and enforce taxation, an 
operational deployment that Colbert refined in the 17
th century – and to fight against other r ulers or 
would-be rulers. Even when engaged in the defensive actions, the Gregorian princes were protecting not 
their populations, but their own tax-producing territories. 
38 After all, God was supposed to make his will clear with regard to who was supposed to have the 
authority, but not to specify the geographical boundaries of authority. This was of course a non-issue until 
the pre-Gregorian universalistic attitude had some appeal. As pointed out in the text, however, it became a 
very practical problem once universalism broke down and the figure of the ruler was secularized.  25 
 
made it apparent that the monarch could obtain full sovereignty and legitimacy only by 
escaping the religious hold. The secular age reveals the consequences of such efforts.  
  Not unexpectedly, the key, and therefore the critical divide between the 
Gregorian and the Secular period, revolves around the assessment of the relationship 
between the ruler and its subjects. As mentioned earlier in this section, this relationship 
bears on two different levels: authority and power, although it is obvious that once the 
latter is questioned, the former is inevitably also open to scrutiny. The Westphalia 
Treaties gave practical content to the notion whereby in order for the divine order to be 
obtained, religious guidance and interference were not needed (Koselleck, 1979). Of 
course, this declaration applied to the Catholic Church as well, which in fact refused to 
recognize the Treaties.  
In order to secularize the state, four steps had to be taken. If legitimacy for the 
state could no longer come from above, it had to come from below (the individual or the 
head of the household, depending upon what the  elementary constitutive part of a 
society is assumed to be). Here lies the original need for a contract between the 
individual and the authority. In addition, natural rights had to be re-defined in order to 
make sure that it would be natural (i.e. morally compelling) for the individual to engage 
in a social covenant. Third, for the contract to be valid or to make any sense, it had to 
take place between equals. Finally, in order for the contract to be a ‘social’ contract, it 
could not concern direct, personal exchange, but rather focus on the development of the 
state as a way to protect society.  
The transition was not easy
39, but it turned out to be successful. As we know, the 
Enlightenment brought about the switch from government based on compliance with the 
Divine Order, to government as a result of a contract. The contractarian element was 
deemed inevitable, since a natural social trait/instinct was recognized as typical of the 
individual, as the Greeks had already claimed over two thousand years earlier
40. The 
vision of the Secular Period differed from the Greeks in two crucial aspects, though. 
First, all men were now equal (the Gregorian legacy), especially if Christians and with a 
white skin. They occupied different roles on earth, but human nature was one. Second, 
whereas for the Greeks an individual acquired his human nature only by becoming an 
                                                 
39 See for instance Kühnel (2001) for an investigation into the many uncertainties and conflicts that 
characterized the birth of the contractarian state in the late 17
th century.  
40 This contrasts with the Gregorian vision, whereby man is born without social instincts and society is 
the product of the individual’s rational choice. See the text below. 26 
 
active member of society, in the Secular Period the individual is born a human being: he 
antedates society and consciously decides to form a community. The relation between 
man and society – the substance of the (social) contract – can take different forms. For 
example, the individual’s determination to be part of a society can be motivated by his 
desire to enhance his prosperity or his mere survival (e.g. – Grotius and Hobbes)
41; or 
by the instinctive, God-instilled quest to obtain the ultimate goal of the Divine order, 
rationally discovered to be peace (e.g. Pufendorf); or by an  encompassing utilitarian 
choice (man needs society in order to interact and become a rational being), which leads 
to a contract, which in turn defines the limits of s tate action (Thomasius)
42.  As 
mentioned above, common to all these views is the notion that human beings follow 
their nature only by joining a social context
43. In other words, the individual is a human 
being because, and only because, his very living in a social context gives him his human 
qualities, develops his ability to reason and obtain his natural goals
44.  
Of course, this reverses the Gregorian/medieval perspective, whereby man is 
born endowed with a bundle of natural rights and society is just a product of interaction, 
possibly a tool of self-improvement, definitely not an actor in its own right
45. Surely, the 
contractarian vision also requires that all individuals (including the ruler) are subject to 
the law. But this no longer means equality before God and God’s law, for there is little 
                                                 
41 It is not by accident that as soon as he set foot on English soil, William III hurried to distribute a 
‘Declaration’ explaining his contract with the English people and his commitment to guaranteeing peace 
and security, unlike what people feared would happen under James II. 
42 This concept will of course be further developed by Rousseau, who will claim in Du Contrat Social that 
if the individual is to obtain his natural goals within a properly-designed social context, it becomes the 
task of the social elites to define and offer the appropriate social rules and conditions. Of course, the 
difference being that Rousseau’s contract is not really a contract, for Rousseau’s state is legitimized 
neither by God, nor by the individual, but rather by an ideal. In particular, la volonté générale is neither 
the protection of individual rights (Locke), nor the expression of the general will (Hobbes). Instead, it 
defines what is needed in order to ensure that the individual finds and pursues his true nature after having 
been contaminated by a corrupt environment. Hence, the 18
th century attempt to transform the nature of 
the contract, from one based on securing peace (and possibly property rights) to one based on the 
accomplishment of an ideal hidden to the normal human being by a veil of moral corruption. 
43 In this respect Hobbes was however the only author who had the courage to draw the  obvious 
consequences: not only must an individual necessarily be part of a social contract, but all those who are 
outside, or who consider themselves outside have to be crushed, both because they have lost or rejected 
their nature of human being and because by going against their (social) nature, they represent a danger to 
society. 
44 As will emerge from the next section, these ‘natural’ goals were clearly articulated during the 
Gregorian and Secular historical periods, but not during the age of social responsibility. Nationalism 
provided a short-lived substitute, with dramatic consequences. 
45 It might be worth pointing out that the medieval notion of peace is indeed defined as the absence of 
war; whereas the secular notion implies an active search for harmony, not unlike what can be perceived 
when observing the activities of several national and transnational organizations (governments and 
agencies) in the age of social responsibility (which includes today). 27 
 
room for God in the secular period. Rather, it is equality before man’s created law, 
which inevitably implies equality under the ruler’s law. 
From the standpoint of economic theorizing, the secular vision obviously eased 
the transition from the classical-Greek notion of economics to its modern version, 
whereby it becomes ‘political economy’ and aims at studying the technical and moral 
features of economic interaction. The welfare enhancement of the whole also became 
part of the social contract. Hence, proper understanding of economic investigation 
turned out to be one of the critical elements required of the ruler. 
The early classical economists saw their role cast in this v ery mold, and 
recommended limited government intervention in order to obtain social happiness and 
peace, with arguments partly based on efficiency (wealth creation) and partly on 
morality (non-interference with natural rights)
46. Practically, however, the secular vision 
opened the way to policy-making spurred by the rule-makers’ judgment and justified by 
results. Although lip-service continued to be paid to individual rights, these gradually 
became defined only within the framework of a social moral standard. This is hardly 
surprising, since individual compliance with such a social moral standard is what 
empowers the individual to be part of the social contract
47. 
 
The Age of Social Responsibility 
The fundamental flaw in the contractarian approach of the secular period was its very 
ambiguity towards the role of religion. Its weakness became particularly clear during 
the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic interval. 
Ironically, the first one turned out to be sustainable because it rejected the contractarian 
solution and went back to a new Gregorian system based on a set of God-given 
individual rights enforced by a Lockean ruler endowed with minimal power
48. The 
                                                 
46 Adam Smith well typifies the doubts of the early economists faced with political economy as a moral 
science (and a branch of philosophy), as the late 17
th century authors used to claim. In fact, Adam Smith 
bypassed the problem by claiming that a free-market system is both morally superior (it does not violate 
property rights) and functionally superior (it creates more wealth) to any other system (i.e. mercantilism). 
47 It remains unclear whether ideals are enough to motivate a social contract, as Rousseau would have it. 
It seems that the answer is in the negative if the social contract has ‘rational’ ambitions, i.e. it claims a 
theoretical foundation, as the neo-contractarian theories would maintain. It is also in the negative from a 
Gregorian perspective, which denies the secular nature of the deal. But the answer might take the opposite 
sign if irrational elements are taken into account, such as the refusal of individual responsibility, to be 
discussed shortly. 
48 We suggest that the American institutional success had little to do with the very fact of having 
introduced the Constitution that Americans were expecting. First, because that choice was in fact the 28 
 
French Revolution failed because although the peasants and most bourgeois were more 
or less happy about the goal of the contract (equality before the law and private 
property), almost everybody also thought to have full rights to his fair share of power. 
This was not what the Revolutionary leaders had in mind: the goals of the Revolution 
changed as it unfolded, disorder (and terror) ensued. As we know, chaotic conditions in 
France during the last years of the century were the primary cause of the rise to power 
of Buonaparte, a successful general who promised and delivered peace and order (at 
home). But it is also no accident that that very general never considered the social 
contract a serious basis for his power and quickly resorted to building up some kind of 
divine legitimacy for him and for his offspring  – first through Papal crowning, then 
through marriage to Marie Louise. 
  In fact, the new historical environment that emerged at the beginning of the 20
th 
century drew heavily on the lessons taught by the French experience of the late 18
th and 
early 19
th centuries and took advantage of the opportunities offered by the industrial 
revolution. In particular, the new age featured a holistic agreement that proceeded from 
the elites down to the people. It was a promise of peace, prosperity, qualified power 
sharing (through modern democracy), and it eliminated the need to conceive or refer to 
a suitable, legitimate contract between the individual and the ruler. Put differently, the 
solution to the threat of revolutionary instability and chaos was not a new definition of 
justice and legitimacy, but a consequentialist claim by the elites: “We rule for the good 
of the nation and we have the right to rule as long as we fulfill our commitment”. In 
turn, the promise to deliver prosperity  involved (and involves) three central ideas: all 
the members of society are given privileges, thereby transforming the economy into a 
system of interacting rent-seekers; all citizens are offered a chance to obtain a share of 
discretionary power, i.e. the race to power is open to everybody; the notion of personal 
                                                                                                                                               
result of an imposition upon the thirteen colonies by an elite wary of people’s emotions and thus of direct 
democracy. In addition, when the representatives met in Philadelphia they actually had no power to vote a 
new (federal) constitutional document, but just to amend the Articles of Confederation, a document that 
reflected well the limited support that the American Revolution enjoyed before the English Armies 
conceded defeat. In addition, at the time it was clear, and the delegates were fully aware, that a popular 
referendum might have produced embarrassing results: the Constitution was finally approved by ad hoc 
state Conventions, bypassing state congressional that had appointed the delegates to Philadelphia. Of 
course, the above does not mean that it was a ‘bad’ constitution; but merely that it was adopted neither in 
accordance with people’s will, nor in accordance with the very principles it purported to protect.. 
   See also Bennett (2003, chapter 4), according to whom the key to the American success lies in a system 
that succeeded in keeping the people involved and interested in the world of politics and in believing in 
productive interaction with authority. Although, adherence to the Founders’ rules of the game was rather 
quickly forgotten, the spirit of the game remained in place for a longer period.  29 
 
responsibility is reformulated and  de facto reduced within an encompassing social 
context guaranteed by appointed rulers. Thus results the notion of social responsibility. 
As can be observed, such three promises are not a contract in order to legitimize a ruler 
or define the essence of ‘good government’, but rather a general agreement to share the 
newly created wealth, the only restraint being provided by the need to prevent possible 
reaction by the victims of this new rent-seeking game.  
World War I and its immediate aftermath marked the beginning of this new 
era
49. The result was and is a new version of the Rousseauian ‘General Will’, where 
managing the Will and taking action has become more important than the defining the 
Will; where consensus (populism) has replaced virtue; and where the democratic 
process has solved the authority problem. 
  The rent-seeking element of the deal makes all the members of a society feel 
entitled to take part in an illusory win-win game that distributes privileges – ‘freedoms’, 
according to the vocabulary of the Gregorian centuries  – following a flexible and 
pragmatic (i.e. consensus-driven) criterion, subject to political contingencies, agreement 
about the desirable outcomes, expectations, available resources. Of course, the system is 
self-reinforcing if growth is satisfactory. When so, even the unhappy members have an 
incentive to confirm the rent-seeking principles of the social-responsibility system, and 
to confine their efforts to reforming its operational devices – e.g. ordinary laws – in 
order to change the identities of the beneficiaries and the size of the benefits. But self-
destruction looms if growth is sluggish or negative, so that free lunches become 
manifestly scarce and promises lose credibility.  
  Power sharing and consensus are the other pillars of post-WWI Western 
societies. Power sharing reinforces the rent-seeking mechanisms and enhances 
consensus. Contrary to past historical experiences, power sharing during the age of 
social responsibility represents the possibility of climbing the power ladder broadly 
understood, either within the political structure or within the bureaucracy, possibly 
jumping from one to the other, not to mention the revolving-door options already 
referred to. This is now workable thanks to the greater wealth, which allows for 
unprecedented increases in taxation and thus an expansion in the public sector. Success 
                                                 
49 The American and British experiences are of course different, for neither countries went through 
Westphalia; moreover, the impact of WWI in the USA was very different from that experienced across 
the Ocean. 30 
 
sometimes depends on loyalty to the rulers’ elite (top politicians), most frequently it 
takes place within autonomous, self-governing structures (the bureaucracy). Crucial in 
this game is that attempts to climb the ladder seldom fail completely. In most cases, real 
power sharing remains a dream, but those who give it a try remain with the hope of 
having a chance to do better next time and always end up with micro-rents in their 
pockets. Even a petty job in the civil service becomes a (passive) rent if one shirks and 
de facto transforms it into some sort of anticipated state pension. In this light, 
destroying the machine becomes pointless. Those with the political entrepreneurial 
abilities to do so usually find it more rewarding to try their luck and apply their skills 
within the system, while the less able go for the passive rents.  
This forms the foundation of consensus (or lack of conflict) and also defines the 
limits of discretionary policy-making by the authorities, who are required to feed the 
rent-seeking game and at the same time generate enough wealth to meet expectations. 
This task is certainly easier in relatively affluent contexts, where the expected losses 
from social conflict are greater and therefore tolerance of abuse possibly more generous.  
  This context also defines the notion of social responsibility, which reflects the 
position of the individual within society and the way he perceives and reacts to 
experience. In a word, social responsibility means that individuals believe they live in 
an environment in which they are presented with opportunities. However, opportunities 
are not equally distributed, and a society based on consensus is legitimized insofar as it 
is able to hand out privileges (freedoms/rents) to compensate those that can claim to 
have been the victims of unfairness (bad luck, nature, some forms of exploitation
50). Put 
differently, whereas the notion of economic fairness (access to minimum wealth) 
defines what is needed in order to guarantee consensus and stability, the concept of 
unfairness defines the point at which individual responsibility ends and taking action 
becomes a social obligation. It therefore happens that large areas of economic activities 
fall under the umbrella of social-responsibility. Noticeable examples are the labor 
market, but also health, education, savings (pensions) and even some manufacturing. In 
this light, for instance, a piece of legislation which creates a rent is no longer perceived 
                                                 
50 The notion of exploitation depends on the definition of liberty. If the latter is understood as ‘absence of 
coercion’, then exploitation can only occur by means of physical violence (e.g. slavery). On the other 
hand, if liberty means “access to a wide-enough range of opportunities”, then exploitation actually refers 
to all situations where one of the actors is characterized by deep pockets and the other gets the short end 
of the stick.  31 
 
as a crime, as it would be in a classical-liberal world, where it would be pointed out that 
A’s privilege is actually paid by the simultaneous creation of a duty imposed upon the 
rest of community. Instead, it is regarded as an act of collective quasi-compulsory 
fairness towards individuals who are not guilty for their misfortunes, who are not 
required to react to overcome their problems or to work hard to reach their goals, or 
who are simply entrusted with a mission for the common weal. Of course, whenever the 
agent acts in order to achieve a collective objective, individual responsibility for the 
outcome declines and the potential cost of failure becomes a cost for society as a whole 
to bear.  
 
5.  Summing up: the historical rules in perspective  
To be honest, the historical approach put forward in these pages does accept the 
contractarian starting point, in that it recognizes that a society can only be created by 
individuals. It also shares the view that the intrinsic strength of a community depends on 
the extent to which a set of interacting agents believe that cooperation serves their own 
interests. Furthermore, it is fully acknowledged that cooperation works better when 
institutions are effective: that is, when they contribute to protect and enforce property 
rights and do not provoke distortions in relative prices, which therefore reflect scarcity 
and provide incentives to those engaging in entrepreneurial activities.  
Unlike the contractarian approach, however, the historical view does not pay 
much attention to how the world should be, where it should be going or how its rulers 
should be selected or constrained. This does not deny that a social scientist – or any 
other human being – can have his own ideas on these issues. But it does mean that an 
opinion is not a theory and has little or no normative power. Opinions do not explain. If 
anything, they express personal preferences or informed guesses about risky or 
uncertain events. In fact, the analytical strategy suggested here focuses on identifying 
the axiomatic principles that keep a community together, the First Principles; and on 
explaining the sets of institutions and policy actions consistent with – and imposed by – 
those principles. It is surely interesting to detect and possibly quantify the consequences 
of those rules on aggregate or sectorial economic performance, a task that economic 
statisticians have been confronting for decades with increasingly sophisticated tools and 32 
 
mixed success. From our standpoint, however, such exercises have an 
informative/documentary value, but little explanatory or predictive content
51.  
Put differently, although it is not denied that we are living in an imperfect 
environment, the way the world changes and advances does not depend on the various 
categories of substantial and/or formal piecemeal solutions that social engineers might 
suggest. Progress hardly means better social goals or top-down improved meta-rules. 
Instead, the evolution in political structures and in the attitudes towards policy making 
depends on historical accidents and deep institutional changes, which in turn occur as a 
result of a combination of new ideological constructions, accidents (again), 
technological progress, decay affecting the previous set of First Principles. One might 
contend that this perspective smacks of relativism, since First Principles may evolve as 
a civilization moves from one historical period to the other. Or perhaps one can retort 
that First Principles remain the same, although the way they are acknowledged changes, 
thereby affecting human behavior and interaction. A typical example is the modification 
in the perception of the sacredness of property rights and the extent to which they can be 
legitimately encroached upon. Another example is the  notion of punishment for 
criminal behavior, which in the past was often maiming and death, today is generally 
imprisonment or relatively mild constraints on the criminal’s freedom to move. 
Still, the role of the relativist debate within the present context should not be over-
emphasized. It is of course true that all normative ambitions necessarily depend on the 
definition of First Principles, and that according to a  large group of political 
philosophers these are not necessarily eternal. The very fact of continued disagreement 
on this question across time proves the point.  Nonetheless, two additional aspects 
should be kept in mind. Those who raise the relativist question, no matter which answer 
they offer, are bound to develop their argument by accepting subjectivism as the basic 
operational principle of a community which, after all, are those typical of the 
individuals that create and maintain it. This holds true even when the reasoning is 
turned on its head, and it is claimed that a principled society is one that does not fall 
apart and offers a collective identity (a culture?) to its members. For even in this case 
the ultimate judge remains the individual. Thus, concentrating on the subjectivist debate 
is probably more relevant than coming to terms with relativism. Explanations require a 
                                                 
51 The Austrian literature has already discussed at length these matters since its very inception (the 
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proper understanding of what communities do, of why they do it. That shows the 
importance of apprehending the belief structure with reference to which the members of 
a community operate, of clarifying what policy-making is expected to do, rather than 
focusing on what it ought to do in order to pursue an abstract goal (e.g. virtue, as the 
classical Greeks asserted, or peace, as Hobbes claimed, or consensus, as Hayek wrote).  
To conclude, in the Western case neither relativism, nor Natural Law provides 
an ex-ante explanation of why the overwhelming majority of the Westerners are rather 
happy with the incumbent political structures
52. The former is almost tautological, 
whereas the latter is either ad hoc (when in the Rousseauian sense) or simply remote 
from the current way of thinking (when in the Gregorian sense). As we have already 
seen, in the age of social responsibility individuals might not be all satisfied with the 
prevailing distribution of rents, or with the dominant redistribution patterns of income 
and wealth, but the presence and desirability of the rent-seeking activities is hardly 
questioned. The (democratic) procedure through which the rent-seeking structure is to 
be altered is also generally accepted. This does not imply that the present context is 
morally sound or coherent. Today’s democracies are not a benevolent version of the 
Hobbes-Leibnitz version of the state
53. The ruler’s assurance of extensive rent-seeking 
weakly backed up by a legitimate threat of violence should the members of the 
community refuse allegiance is not a substitute for the 17
th-century promise to pursue 
happiness (lack of conflict). Similarly, protection from (which actually means 
spreading) the cost of uncertainty and accidents is not the same as guaranteeing 
protection from physical violence. Still, even if those who believe in everlasting Natural 
Laws rightly maintain that these are violated, the substantial firmness of post WWI 
Western societies proves that the First Principles typical of the age of social 
responsibility are being complied with; moreover, the features and implications of such 
Principles are crucial when trying to understand the dynamics of norms in general and 
of normative economics in particular. Besides, the alternatives are not exciting: as will 
                                                 
52 The emphasis on the need for ex ante explanations is not accidental, as it emphasizes the need to assess 
the connection between the set of shared preferences and beliefs (First Principles) that characterize a 
historical period and policy-making. On the other hand, ex post explanations are either no explanation at 
all (mere induction, instead), or they imply that facts, and facts only, affect and determine shared values – 
an extreme and somewhat distorted form of behaviouralism. 
53 See ‘An unpublished manuscript of Leibniz on the allegiance due to sovereign powers’, published in 
Riley (1972: 199-217). 34 
 
be put forward in the next paragraphs, the contractual, the institutional and the 
evolutionary approach are of little help in explaining today’s policy-making contexts. 
 
On the contractarian shortcomings once again 
Starting from Veblen, over a century ago the paleo-institutionalists
54 rightly held that 
both atomism
55 and holistic institutionalism are fragile starting points for economic 
theorizing. On the contrary, they maintained that the challenge for any economist (and 
social scientist, one might add) is to understand the nature and consequences of the rules 
of the game (institutions) on individual behavior. The individual, however, is not a 
tabula rasa where rules operate by creating incentive systems. Instead, he is a moral 
agent who reacts to outside stimuli following his perceptions, preferences and 
ideologies.  
Unfortunately, although lip service is often paid to the paleo-institutional 
insights, their implications are almost systematically ignored. True enough, these 
classes of interaction are difficult to grasp, l et alone to model or quantify. Still, 
difficulties do not justify oversight or outright blindness. 
The contractarian view is no exception: its advocates are also deaf to the paleo-
institutional lesson, with consequences. Earlier on it in this chapter has been shown that 
the contractarian solutions to the many imperfections of today’s policy-making are less 
than adequate because they strive to legitimize the state through arguments that either 
rely on arbitrary consequentialism or on weak forms of utilitarianism. As a matter of 
fact, constitutional theories stricto sensu include both features: They ultimately validate 
restricted personal freedom and therefore government action, when this is perceived by 
the legislator as necessary to obtain the best of all possible worlds. The illusion of the 
human being tacitly signing the constitutional contract behind the veil of uncertainty de 
facto empowers the policy-maker to resort to ordinary law-making to pursue a goal that 
the veil makes sure nobody can really identify. In contrast, the quasi-minimal view does 
distance itself from consequentialism, but is nevertheless unable to overcome the 
                                                 
54 This term has been effectively used by Adams (1994: 346) in order to single out those authors who 
drew attention to the dual origin of individual behavior: rational self interest dictated by preferences, 
which however mix with “ideas, values, rules of thumb, urges and misconceptions” when interacting in a 
social context.  
55 According to the atomistic vision individuals do react to social incentives. Such incentives do not, 
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liberum veto problem
56 unless the ruler is endowed with the power to sidestep 
subjectivism. By doing that, however, some degree of discretion and utilitarianism must 
necessarily be accepted.  
Last, but not least, all contractarian theories say very little about the 
interpretation of the social contract. If interpretation is subjective, then all contracts 
become a matter of good will and informal- or self-enforcement (as opposed to coercive 
enforcement). The state vanishes as a consequence. If interpretation is entrusted to a 
third party, then designation becomes a political question. It doesn’t take much to fear 
that discretionary powers will be exploited to promote personal advancement and vanity 
(e.g. making the headlines), to pay political debts, or even to pursue one’s honest belief 
about the real meaning of the constitutional covenant. In other words, the very tools that 
must be put in place to give the social contract operational content are the instruments 
that sink it. Recent examples along these lines abound in the American constitutional 
literature, which opposes those who believe that the Founding Fathers should be read as 
the authors of a document stating eternal and uninfringeable principles, with those 
persuaded that the Bill of Rights is a living text that acquires new meanings as time 
evolves and the notion of morality changes
57. No matter who is right, there is no 
gainsaying the rules of the game prevailing in today’s American politics are far from 
those the Founding Fathers had imagined over two centuries ago. 
 
On the institutional temptation 
                                                 
56 Beginning in 1652, the liberum veto gave each member of the Polish Diet the power to block legislation 
and paralyze the assembly. As reported in Dunn (1979: 74), recourse to liberum veto brought 90% of the 
Polish Diets to their knees, a particularly fateful experience when the circumstances required the ability to 
levy substantial funds to raise an army and keep foreign aggressors at bay, e.g. in the late 18
th century. Of 
course, it remains to be assessed to what extent the Polish population always identified oppression with 
foreign annexation. 
57 The American case is in several respects unique. It can be considered the only surviving “Gregorian” 
document, in that it was conceived as a set of principles to protect individual freedom from government 
abuse. The democratic procedures prescribed by the American constitution were meant to ensure that 
those principles could not be overturned and, possibly more important, to give it strength and legitimacy 
through popular representation, without however giving the representatives much discretionary power. It 
is no secret that Congress initially had very little power and that its representatives did not enjoy much 
prestige. 
  As already mentioned in section 2., the American experience is in sharp contrast with most European 
Constitutions. Sometimes these were just a symbolic effort to mark a change in political regime and give 
legitimacy to the new rulers (or to the old rulers in new clothes). Sometimes they were a way to partition 
power among the various political groups under a (demagogic) cloud of wishful thinking. Not 
surprisingly, most of the time European constitutions actually present both features. 36 
 
The institutional approach is probably more attractive, in that it escapes both 
consequentialism and utilitarianism, while offering a number of statements with which 
it is easy to agree: institutions matter, what happened in the past has an impact on 
individuals’ present and future decisions, individuals sometimes take action to modify 
existing organizations or to create new agencies altogether, formal rules interact and 
sometimes conflict with informal rules. From the institutional perspective, change takes 
place in two forms: as a consequence of a shock (e.g. a war) or following a 
‘representational description’, that is a situation where the conflict between informal 
and formal institutions forces the individual to wake up, abandon the ongoing smooth 
path-dependent process, and shape new beliefs. When this happens, the old rules of 
governing interaction with the institutional  environment are disrupted and if a new 
system of social, economic, political variables consolidates, a new path-dependent 
context comes to the surface
58. 
  The major flaw in the institutional story is the fact that unless one crosses the 
border into determinism, it offers a description rather than an explanation. As a result, 
the nature of policy-making must necessarily be left out of the picture, since it is not 
conceived as the origin of institutional legitimacy. If anything, it is presented as the 
result of activities carried out by some organizations (including the state) that have been 
created by groups of individuals with the purpose of reducing transaction costs or of 
generating and exploiting rents, the only restraint being consistency with the prevailing 
informal rules. This is plausible when informal rules exist, are firmly in place and 
openly affect individual behavior, as exemplified in Ellickson (1991). But it is not very 
useful when informal rules do not exist (or are almost irrelevant, as it frequently 
happens in a world characterized by impersonal exchange/transactions), nor is it useful 
when rule-making is about redistributing income or regulating the relationship between 
the individual and the state (a citizen’s duties and privileges), rather than among 
individuals. The latter case applies of course to policies in general. 
  By borrowing the institutional terminology, one could therefore refer to the 
features of our historical periods as to the institutions typical of the Old Institutional 
School. Nonetheless, the notion of path-dependence becomes all but useless, as it is 
now taken to identify the mechanisms through which, for each historical period, 
technology and ideology direct the main policy-making actors playing the game of 
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power and competing for power. The rest is a matter of accidents, no matter how 
important they might be. More important, and contrary to the (old) institutional 
argument, we maintain that institutions do not greatly affect individual perceptions
59. 
Ideas/ideologies do. And when the rules of the game (institutions) run against those 
perceptions, then society cracks, loses its cohesion, perhaps falls apart while individuals 
revolt. 
 
Is policy-making evolutionary? 
How does our approach compare with the evolutionary approach? According to such 
view, economics should study how individuals adapt through production, consumption 
and exchange, led by their efforts to improve their conditions in the presence of variable 
rules of the game and scarcity
60. In the past, the emphasis was on the role played by 
physical constraints (Malthus). Towards the end of the 19
th century, more importance 
was devoted to men’s way of thinking and to the established social relations (Veblen). 
More recently, the focus has moved towards the role of legislation and institutions 
widely understood: for instance, the free market system is one of the possible selection 
mechanisms, which forces agents to adapt and provides sets of incentives that direct 
people’s actions and reactions, thereby creating a competitive process (Alchian).  
  All in all, even if mainstream economics maintains a different perspective, it is 
hard to disagree with the fundamental evolutionary argument: agents do not compete to 
maximize their happiness (or their profits). Instead, they adapt in order to improve their 
well-being or avoid worse conditions. The way they do so depends on their 
psychological patterns, on the behavioral routines inherited from the past, as well as on 
the characteristics of every human being (against the typical-agent assumption). This 
might lead to situations of conflict. Such situations, however, stem from the agents’ 
efforts to survive or to improve their own condition. They are not necessarily a goal per 
se. When entering a new market or developing a new product, an entrepreneur aims at 
satisfying demand, not at exterminating incumbents. 
                                                 
59 The institutionalists usually refer to behavior, a term which might however generate some confusion. 
We prefer to make a distinction between psychological patterns and behavioral routines. The former 
include the way reality is perceived and provide the guidelines along which the individuals’ reactions to 
opportunities available unfold. The latter concern the way individuals actually behave given the biting 
constraints to which they are subject. 
60 See for instance Hodgson (1993). 38 
 
  Of course, these evolutionary statements are not denied here. Rather, the matter 
of contention regards the role played by culture (mental habits and systematic informal 
rules of social interaction). According to the evolutionary view, culture is subject to 
gradual change according to a path-dependent process, punctuated by accidents that can 
eventually alter its speed and direction. Thus, economic life would reflect the evolving 
nature of culture and scarcity (technology, demography). Nonetheless, the border 
between description and explanation appears thin, for unless one has a theory of cultural 
path-dependence, social interaction and its developments can only be ‘explained’ ex 
post, which is indeed what happens when one describes. As a consequence, and quite 
understandably, the evolutionary school has little to say in terms of policy-making, 
other than claiming that there is scope for intervention whenever the cultural legacy 
leads people to behave inefficiently
61, and at the same time warning the rule-maker 
about the potential damages provoked by the introduction of formal rules that run 
against the prevailing informal environment. 
As a matter of fact, we do not object to the evolutionary (and paleo-institutional) 
notion whereby ideologies shape social interaction and affect social dynamics. 
However, we also claim that the ideological framework does not evolve, but is simply 
subject to a very limited number of deep changes, a selection mechanism operates, one 
which is driven by the quest for power and constrained by the current technology. The 
evolutionary school defines a stable regime as a situation resulting from repeated 
actions that have proved successful through time, but which continues to be subject to 
gradual and continuous change. In fact, stability as commonly understood is ruled out 
almost by definition. Instead, according to our historical perspective, within each 
historical period stability means constant psychological patterns in accordance with the 
First Principles of the time, which by definition remain fixed within each period. 
Interactions might change behavioral features, of course, as a result of new 
technological opportunities, which sometimes expand the range of possible individual 
choices, sometimes increase the scope and opportunities for additional policy-making. 
                                                 
61 This is indeed Veblen’s view, which is not necessarily shared by other evolutionary scholars. They 
might deplore the way people adapt, but they do not necessarily advocate rule-making as a way to 
interfere with the choices driven by the evolutionary principles mentioned in the text. At most, they fall 
back on the minimal institutional position, whereby policy-making is good whenever it reduces 
transaction costs without violating the Pareto-optimality conditions (no member of the community must 
result worse off as a result of the policy measure). The verdict remains ambiguous when the individuals 
negatively affected by the policy measure are worse off because intervention has reduced or eliminated 
their rents. 39 
 
Nonetheless, feedbacks on the ideological structure are moderate or altogether absent, 
since the structure remains dominated by the last deep institutional change
62.  
Hence, culture does matter, in that it can be claimed that First Principles define 
the cultural environment, which amounts to saying that culture counts if one defines this 
concept as the content of the deep institutional change. And there is no doubt that a 
community can go through cultural changes. For instance, we conjecture that the West 
went through three such changes. Similarly, one can make the case for different 
societies or civilization  featuring different cultures, since one presumes that not all 
societies underwent the same deep institutional change.  
But it can also be maintained that culture does not count (much) if one regards it 
as a system of steady, resilient behavioral patterns dictated by tradition, established 
informal rules and habit. One can surely observe that people do follow informal rules, 
but there is no doubt that those informal rules are quickly abandoned when they do not 
work, or when they become an impediment to obtain higher levels of well-being. An 
example is provided by generations of immigrants or, more recently, by how quickly 
young people in post-communist countries have adopted ‘Western values’. Similarly, 
one can definitely observe habits, such as the use of monetary means of exchange or 
language. But these can hardly be called ‘culture’ in an evolutionary sense: money is 
not used because our ancestors used it, but because it is useful and its use makes nobody 
worse off
63. In fact, as soon as the technology allowed for new means of payment (e.g. 
plastic cards with a magnetized strip) many individuals rapidly reduced their use of bills 
and coins. Similarly, we do not speak a language because our ancestors spoke that 
idiom, but because that is what our parents taught us and because we find it more 
difficult to express ourselves in other languages. But there is of course no cultural 
barrier that prevents millions and millions of people from learning another language in 
order to make sure that others understand what they are saying or read what they are 
writing (or vice-versa).  
                                                 
62 Of course, this does not deny that technological progress might spark new moral debates (e.g. on 
cloning). But these hardly lead to major shifts in the psychological patterns. Although exceptions are 
ubiquitous, different attitudes generally reflect differences in opinions, not in First Principles. 
63 One might object that the introduction of paper money by the state implies some kind of violence, for 
the term ‘legal tender’ actually implies that nobody can refuse legal tender as a means of payment. This 
constraint can, however, be bypassed with relative ease in free capital and goods markets and needs not 
be pursued further. 40 
 
To conclude, we posit that evolutionary economics offers rather limited help in 
understanding the nature or the foundations of policy-making. Surely, it emphasizes the 
role of the social environment and predicts that policies evolve according to the way 
accidents affect – and generate routines that are ultimately incorporated into – culture. 
Yet, we do not believe this to be enough and we therefore make a different point. That 
is, we maintain that successful policy-making is about gathering consensus on a fixed 
set of issues defined by the last deep institutional shock. One can of course discuss 
about how deep a deep institutional shock is; or how large consensus must be in order to 
define First Principles. That is indeed today’s challenge for the policy maker, who 
might have to look for new ways and identify a new agenda to bolster consensus, should 
the features of the current historical period weaken.  
 
6.  A program for (hard) empirical work 
To repeat, our perspective considers historical periods as characterized by the fact that 
given rules of the game are more or less accepted by the members of a community 
thanks to a system of shared social postulates, if not ideologies. In each period, such 
members might not like the ensuing political outcome and might want to have a better 
system, a better ruling elite, or both. But within each period neither the exercise of 
power nor the boundaries of power are seriously questioned. With very limited 
exceptions, not even the procedure to select the ruler is an issue.  
  In particular, during the age of social responsibility, the prevailing ideology 
(First Principles) has accepted top-down policy making for the sake of peace, qualified 
power sharing extended rent-seeking, and reduced individual responsibilities within the 
economic domain. Hence, it is apparent that a society can break down when the rulers 
are manifestly incapable of avoiding turmoil and/or unable to provide satisfactory 
opportunities for rent-seeking and/or ask its members to be economically responsible. 
Put differently, as long as individuals share the First Principles typical of the age of 
social responsibility, rule-makers confronting a crisis will make the ‘right’ decision in 
coming to the rescue of those who suffer most, in making sure that major shocks are 
avoided, in making promises guaranteeing a soft landing should further disturbances 
occur. The very fact that these policies make little economic sense is of course 
irrelevant, for in the age of social responsibility there is little room for efficiency and 41 
 
other textbook criteria (e.g. moderate taxation, little redistribution, concerns for long-
run effects such as inflation and moral-hazard). 
  Reactions to an economic emergency  from a (new) contractarian standpoint 
would be different, for in this context a crisis is actually irrelevant. In the constitutional 
situation, policy-making should respect the veil of uncertainty, behind which people 
have ruled out rent-seeking and redistribution. As a result, the principle of individual 
responsibility is protected and collective goods only are produced. Failure to do just that 
would imply a violation of the social contract and therefore elicit overt hostility towards 
the rule makers. The quasi-minimal version would lead to a similar conclusion, with 
two differences: the Paretian constraint would ensure that the production of collective 
goods is smaller and  – more importantly  – legitimate policy-making would not be 
driven by consensus or (democratic) majorities, but by Paretian straitjackets and thus 
explicit-consensus guidelines. It then follows that while the Constitutional contract has 
both a (strong) normative and a (mild) explanatory goal, the quasi-minimal contract is 
merely prescriptive, and thus hardly suitable for empirical verification
64. 
We believe that the institutional approach is better suited to undergo empirical 
scrutiny. In particular, two theses can be verified. One regards the possibility of 
institutional change taking place as a consequence of a path-dependent process driven 
by pressure to lower transaction costs. In other words, the institutional argument is that 
institutions evolve because technological progress creates new situations and these 
require new organizational arrangements. Although data gathering may present 
significant empirical and methodological challenges, the economic statistician should 
investigate whether transaction costs per unit of exchange (or their weight out of values 
exchanged) actually follow some kind of monotonic process
65, controlling for (i) the 
increases in productivity provoked by better technologies (rather than by better 
institutions), (ii) the fact that as time goes by more and more transactions (and 
                                                 
64 The explanatory power of a social theory depends on whether the theory is about what rule-makers do, 
or about what they ought to do. The quasi-minimal contract clearly falls in the latter category. It therefore 
surrenders all explanatory ambition and should therefore be considered just as a definition of good 
government and possibly as a benchmark for evaluation. The constitutional contract can be applied for 
explanatory purposes as long as it accepts democracy as the proper procedure to conceive and enforce the 
rules. Its ‘mild’ explanatory power is due to the ambiguities of the constitutional school with respect to 
democracy. Some authors accept it (e.g. Hayek, Buchanan and Vanberg), others qualify  their 
endorsement or have second thoughts (e.g. Hayek 1979, who draws a distinction between democracy and 
“demarchy”. 
65 Efficient path dependence would suggest that the trend should be declining, but some caution is in 
order, for path dependence is not necessarily virtuous. 42 
 
transaction costs) are observed just because lower transaction costs make exchange 
affordable and thus feasible, (iii) the fact that many transaction costs are not observed 
and thus are hard to quantify
66.  
The second institutional concept open for investigation refers to the occurrence 
of institutional change or conflict following acute friction between formal and informal 
rules, as long as formal rules are relevant, i.e. enforced. This kind of exercise, however, 
also presents significant problems. For instance, one must differentiate between those 
tensions generated by formal rules at odds with the informal rules and those created by 
simply bad (inefficient) rules. The former would provoke a cultural crisis and a 
systemic shock, whatever these terms means; the latter would simply require a change 
in the legislator, or in the incentives that drive the legislators’ activities. In some cases, 
drawing the distinction may be easy; in most cases, it might be quite difficult and 
identification problems might arise. Possibly more relevant from a theoretical 
standpoint is the informal/cultural question.  
In order to have a conflict between formal and informal rules, one must have 
resilient informal rules. The early institutional view held that informal rules come first, 
while good formal rules would and should add transparency, publicity and credibility to 
sets of agreement based on shared, consolidated values (culture). Hence, formal rules 
contradicting informal rules would simply be bad rules, which would be amended or 
would lead to turmoil, as mentioned above. More recently, however, it has been 
observed that informal rules take time to form and pass the filter of habit and tradition. 
Nonetheless, technological progress is so fast that it often makes behavioral patterns 
obsolete even before they become stable, shared routines and thus real informal rules. 
Thus, in today’s societies, standardized behavior never succeeds in becoming an 
informal rule. And formal rules no longer fulfill the role of codifying informal rules; 
rather, they anticipate the informal rules that would eventually develop, if those patterns 
had time to go through the time-filtering process. Hence, one might have second 
thoughts about considering the tensions between formal and informal rules. If so, the 
potential for conflict then arises when the incentive structures and perceptions generated 
by technological progress are found inconsistent with the sets of formal rules introduced 
                                                 
66 Qualifications (ii) and (iii) explain why the results of the current efforts to quantify the size of 
transaction costs might be questionable. See North (1994), according to whom transaction costs account 
for about 50% of GDP in a modern economy.  43 
 
by the legislators. This includes policy-making of course. Once again, designing reliable 
experiments that take these issues into proper account and distinguish the historical 
hypothesis from the institutional argument (First Principles and ideologies are more 
powerful than incentive structures in shaping individual perceptions) is not impossible, 
but is hardly amenable to the current statistical techniques of which economists seem to 
have grown particularly fond. 
Finally, testing the evolutionary approach to policy-making is equivalent to 
testing the role that an evolving culture plays in determining the nature of state 
intervention. In particular, the analysis should investigate and compare the changing 
nature and driving forces of policy-making as culture dictates new requirements and 
constraints. That implies that such changing nature and driving forces be identified, and 
that long-term policy trends be c leansed of short-term expedience. Once again, 
technological opportunities should also be taken into account, since their presence can 
potentially generate new evolutionary paths, thereby requiring updated rule-making 
approaches. Of course, the historical v iew would simply maintain that there is no 
substantial change within each historical period (other than those provoked by the new 
technological conditions). Hence, both the evolutionary and the historical approaches 
would predict somewhat variable and possibly erratic policy-making. The difference, 
however, is the question of origin. According to the former view, policy-making is just 
the result of more or less rapidly changing cultural patterns driven by expanding, 
technologically-driven sets of opportunities. Still, clear trends should be discernible, 
with differences across countries or geographic areas. According to the latter view, 
policy-making consists of a set of  ad hoc measures that follow accidental events, 
normally have a short-term horizon and tend to expand the rule-makers’ power without 
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